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1. Introduction
Consumers often aim at target consumption levels of specic goods. Con-
sumer durables (houses, cars) frequently come in indivisible units and the con-
sumer is often satiated with a single unit. He desires just one piece, no more and
no less. Where such a good bulks large in the consumers budget, changes in
its price may have unusual repercussions on demand for other goods. The gross
substitutability property may not obtain. A rise in the price of the target good
may reduce the budget available for other goods and the consumers demand
for them. This a¤ects the existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium.
An important example occurs when the consumer aims at a future consump-
tion target say a house to retire to or a xed payment to an old age home that
will support him. This a¤ects his saving behavior, particularly his reactions to
interest rate changes. Oddly enough, although there is empirical evidence from
household surveys that target saving is an important motivation for saving be-
havior,1 there has been hardly any theoretical modeling of its implications.2
Perhaps this is on account of the fact that target saving behavior is not easily
generated from standard utility functions, an omission that we attempt to re-
pair in a subsequent section. We show that target saving can be generated for
specic and time-varying values of risk aversion parameters which characterize
more standard utility and saving functions. Later we also describe in detail
and provide examples of how our results di¤er from those obtainable with more
standard utility functions.
If target saving behavior occurs on a large scale, equilibrium in the capital
market, the interest rate and the level of output are a¤ected in curious ways.
Saving becomes negatively interest-elastic, so that multiple and unstable equi-
libria become possible, some with high saving even at very low (possibly zero)
interest rates.
It is however well-known that multiplicity and instability of equilibrium are
not easy to handle within the standard rational expectations framework. In
the absence of an extraneous coordination mechanism, people may expect and
act upon any of the many possible equilibria. If they di¤er, the outcome will
predictably diverge from everyones expectations, thus violating the basic con-
ceptual structure of rational expectations. We therefore postulate static expec-
tations3 while exploring multiple and unstable equilibria: people expect current
interest rates to persist, and act accordingly an assumption that yields a well-
dened dynamics. The past now determines the future: initial conditions decide
which of the possible equilibria the economy will converge to, or if it will con-
1Samwick (1998) cites evidence on this from the Survey of Consumer Finances (1992).
2The few studies on this subject that we are aware of are mentioned in the literature review
section.
3Static expectations imply that people expect the future value of the variable in question
to be identical to its value in the present. This is particularly useful when dealing with long
time horizons (eg 30 years) that may reasonably occur within an OLG framework. Since it
is very di¢ cult to forecast so far into the future, people may not attempt to do so and may
reasonably base future expectations on the past.
verge to one at all. If the multiple equilibria are Pareto-rankable, policies can
be prescribed to ensure convergence to a preferred equilibrium.
Excess response of consumption to current income is built into our model.
While a violation of the permanent income hypothesis, this is in line with the
fact that there is an excess sensitivity puzzle, particularly for developing
countries where consumers often violate the permanent income hypothesis (see
Rao [2005], Lavi [2003], Chakrabarty and Schmalenbach [2002]).
In section 2 we discuss some related literature, especially that on target
saving and on multiple equilibria in OLG models. In section 3 we show how
the target saving motive can be derived from standard CRRA utility functions
(much used in the literature on intertemporal choice as summarized, for instance,
in Azariadis (1993) and Romer (1995)) for specic and time varying values
of the risk aversion parameters. Section 4 presents the details of our model
and derives results, along with a number of examples, both for the rational
expectations case and for the static expectations case. Section 5 details further
ways in which our model, its equilibria and results di¤er from those obtainable
with the same production functions but with more standard utility functions.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Some Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge theoretical work on the target saving motive
and its implications is extremely limited. Samwick (1998) studies the likely
e¤ect of pension-related tax reform on savings, for savers with di¤erent types
of motivations. Target savers form one of the groups he considers. Berninghaus
and Seifert-Vogt (1993) study the return migration decision of target-saving
guest workers who have to choose between returning to their home country to
invest in a business and staying on in the host country for one more period.
We now come to the other themes incidental to our paper. Multiple equilibria
can also be obtained in other ways as in Azariadis and Lambertini (2003) who
focus on an imperfect credit market in a deterministic three-generation world.
Our focus is on sketching the consequences of a particular type of behavior
 saving for a xed target - and our model accordingly di¤ers substantially
from theirs. Moreover, expectations in their model are always rational. While
a multitude of papers deal with multiple equilibria in overlapping generations
models in various contexts such as unemployment (Pissarides, 1992), growth
and poverty traps (Boldrin, 1992), fertility (Palivos, 2001), education (Futagami
and Ishiguro, 2004) and endogenous public policy (Glomm and Ravikumar,
1995) these models do not deal with the kind of saving behavior which it is
our purpose to model, nor do they depart from rational expectations. Evans
and Honkapohja (2001) survey the vast literature on multiple equilibria in OLG
models, including Shell (1977), Cass and Shell (1983), Azariadis (1981) and
Azariadis and Guesnerie (1982). Evans and Honkapohja themselves postulate
adaptive learning as a selection device among multiple equilibria. Woodford
(1990) studies a monetary economy with an adaptive learning rule, converging
to a stationary sunspot equilibrium.
Our model is also related to the strand of literature which deals with the
history versus expectationsdebate in economies with externalities. This liter
ature includes Krugman (1991), Matsuyama (1991) and Adsera and Ray (1998)
and centers around decisions to move or migrate into a di¤erent sector with
externalities - decisions based both on current returns and expected future re-
turns. Although our model does not fall in this class, as there are no intersectoral
movement decisions involved, there is an externality in our model as individuals
make their private saving decisions in light of their interest rate expectations,
while the true realizations of interest rates will depend on the decisions of oth-
ers. The history-versus-expectations strand of literature looks at whether long
run equilibria are predictable given history, or whether they depend instead on
self-fullling expectationsand are indeterminate in spite of a known history.
In our model, we nd that for some technologies, indeterminacy can obtain if
expectations are rationally formed however, when people have static expecta-
tions, history has the power to predict the future course of the economy. Our
model di¤ers in two other important respects from the group of models consid-
ered in the history versus expectations debate. First, people in our model have
a xed future goal. Hence their response to possible returns is a¤ected by this.
Secondly, our model has dynamics in the static expectations case, but there are
no dynamics if expectations are rational.
3. Target Savings and Standard Utility Theory
Can target saving behavior be reconciled with standard utility models ?
Consider an individual with a rst period budget of W which he must allocate
to consumption over a two-period horizon in the light of an interest rate of r.
Suppose his utility function is the conventional CRRA function except for the
fact that the coe¢ cient of RRA di¤ers between the two periods:
U = c
1 1
1
1 1 +
c
1 2
2
(1 2)(1+)
Here 1, 2 and  are all positive. He equates the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between the two consumptions to the marginal cost of one in terms of the
other to derive
c
1
1
c
2
2
= 1+1+r .
Without more restrictions on the parameters, one cannot draw any mean-
ingful inferences about his saving behaviour. The standard CRRA function in
which 1 = 2 =  yields
c1
c2
= [ 1+1+r ]
1=
The consumption growth rate is positive if the interest rate exceeds the rate
of time preference and is an increasing function of the interest rate. If  = 1as
with logarithmic felicity functions, it is proportional to the interest rate:
c1
c2
= 1+1+r
All this is standard and occasions no surprise. But di¤erences in RRA
coe¢ cients change the story. Suppose 1 = 0, implying linear rst period felicity.
Then
c2 = [ 1+r1+ ]
1=2 .
If 2 is non-zero, c2 will be independent of the budget W, though still related
to the interest rate r. Now, if in addition 2 =1, we have c2 = 1 the consumer
aims at a xed second period consumption target. The unitary value of c2 is not
restrictive, given that we are free to choose our own units. Target saving is thus
a consequence of a sharp asymmetry between the consumers attitudes to risk
in the present and the future. It occurs if he is risk-neutral in the present but
intensely risk-averse in his view of the future. Alternatively, interpreting  as
the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, target saving characterizes
individuals with insatiable consumption needs today (1 = 0 marginal utility
constant) but very limited wants tomorrow (2 =1 marginal utility dropping
to zero, implying satiation). Note that the consumption target is independent
not only of the budget W but also of both interest rate and time preference.
A comparison of the asymmetric case with that of symmetric RRA coe¢ -
cients 1 = 2 = =1 is of some interest. The latter implies c1 = c2 stability
of consumption between the two periods.4 However, the level at which con-
sumption will be intertemporally stable is an increasing function of the interest
rate (though independent of time-preference). The higher the interest rate, the
higher will be the income from positive saving (as in the present case) and the
higher accordingly the constant level of consumption that it can sustain. Since
not only future, but present consumption as well is increasing in interest rate,
saving will be negatively related to r  though not as strongly as in the case
where the future consumption target is xed.
4.The Model
Assume a world of overlapping generations in which all individuals are iden-
tical. Population is constant with the number in each generation being normal-
ized to one. Each individual lives for two periods. At the outset of the rst,
he borrows capital from the previous generation, now retired, and promises to
repay principal and prenegotiated interest after the production process. He then
produces according to a production function yt = f(kt) + et, where et is a pro-
duction shock with zero mean. Thereafter, he makes the contractual repayment
and allocates the remaining output between consumption ct and saving in the
light of his interest rate expectations and preferences. At the beginning of the
next period, he lends the savings to the new generation of producers at the
interest rate expected in that period and lives in retirement thereafter on his
interest and capital.
As in all models in which population is constant and individuals exhaust
their income over their life-cycle, there is no aggregate saving: however, the
young save to nance their retirement.
Output is a CRS function of capital and labor. The labor force comprises the
entire younger generation and is constant through time. We therefore suppress
the labor argument in the production function and write it simply as f(k).
Competition for capital between producers drives the contractual interest rate
to the marginal product of this capital f
0
(kt) . Since all capital is borrowed, the
young working generation, after repaying its loans, has only its wage income to
consume and save with.
The role of expectations in this process implies that di¤erent models of
expectation formation will have di¤erent consequences. We shall highlight in
4The utility function in this case can be shown, by appropriate transformations, to be of
the Leontief variety U = Min (c1, c2), implying strict complementarity between consumptions
in the two periods and L-shaped indi¤erence curves with vertices along the 45 degree line.
particular the implications of rational expectations on the one hand and of static
expectations on the other. The latter is of interest because rational expectations
in our case do not deliver a denite prediction in the absence of a predictable
exogenous co-ordination mechanism - if the underlying model displays multiple
equilibria.
4.1.1. Rational Expectations
Consider rst the case of rational expectations. Under rational expectations,
the marginal product of capital can be fully forecast given the capital stock at
the time of contracting (which is just the saving carried over from the previous
period by the then working generation). Savers form correct expectations of
this contractual interest rate and base their saving decisions on it. Thus the
contract is signed before the production shock hits. As savers are guaranteed
the interest rate f
0
(kt), they are fully insured against the production shock 
whether positive or negative - which is borne accordingly by the current pro-
ducing generation.
Suppose now that the second period consumption of each individual is xed
at a. Let the younger generations consumption in period t the rst period of
its life be denoted by c1;twhile the olders consumption is c2;t(the older gen-
erations consumption in its youth was c2;t 1). Because individuals are saving
to meet xed targets, we always have
(1) c2;t = a = (1+ f
0
(kt))s2;t 1
After paying the older generation,5 the younger one also wants to save just
enough to ensure a second period consumption of a. Accordingly the produc-
tion shock is entirely absorbed in c1;t, the current consumption of the working
generation. This excess sensitivity of current consumption to transitory income
goes against the permanent income hypothesis, but is a characteristic of target-
savers. The following equation describes the younger generations behavior in
period t + 1, when it gets old:
(2) c2;t+1= a = (1+ f
0
(kt+1))s2;t
Moreover, we have
(3) kt+1 = s2;t rt
From (1), (2) and (3) we can easily check that
(4) s2;t = s2;t 1 = s, kt = kt+1 = k, s = k
Thus the game is stationary, despite the uncertain production shock. If in
any period, the shock is so adverse as to reduce the total income of the younger
generation after interest payments on the older generations loan below the
minimum required to reach the second period target, the young will not save,
but will instead consume everything left over after making interest payments.
No capital will be available next period to sustain production and the economy
will disappear. An economy can be wiped out by a su¢ ciently unfavorable shock
et if
f(kt) + et   ktf1 + f 0(kt)g < a1+f 0 (kt) :
5The young generation can commit to repayment. This is because repayment is veriable
and accordingly default can be deterred by the threat of su¢ ciently harsh legal penalties. Note
that, as we explain later, we focus on a parameter space where true bankruptcy is impossible
and its spectre does not therefore deter lenders.
As long as production shocks are bounded, there is always a parameter
space where this will never happen. For simplicity, we assume that production
shocks are uniformly distributed in the interval [- e*, e*], and for the rest of
this paper concentrate on the case where even the worst shocks leave the young
with enough to reach their second period target so that the economy is in no
danger of disappearing.
4.1.2. Equilibrium under rational expectations
The supply of capital from the old is given by
(5) s = k = a1+r
Here r is the pre-negotiated interest rate that savers will face in the begin-
ning of the next period. The demand of the young for capital, is given by
(6) f
0
(k) = r
Thus equilibrium capital stock solves the equation
(7) k(1 + f
0
(k)) =a
The supply curve is negatively interest-elastic and representable as a rectan-
gular hyperbola in (s; r) space. It is asymptotic to the vertical axis and to the
horizontal through r= -1; it intersects the horizontal axis at s = a . The shape
of the demand curve depends on the production function, and determines the
number of intersections. Given diminishing marginal productivity of capital, the
demand curve is also down-sloping so that multiple intersections are possible.
We now prove
Proposition 1: If the production function has continuous second deriva-
tives, the demand curve always lies below the supply curve for su¢ ciently small
s: and if there is no capital saturation (f
0
(k) > 0 for all k), there is at least one
intersection.
Proof : If, as k ! 0, the limiting elasticity of capital-labor substitution is
less than one, r converges to a nite ceiling,6 so that the demand curve intercepts
the vertical axis at a nite r. In this case clearly the demand curve lies below
the supply curve (which is asymptotic to the vertical axis) for su¢ ciently small
k (or s). If the elasticity of substitution in the limit exceeds one, as k ! 0, the
relative share of capital in total output goes to zero while output tends to a nite
limit;7 if the elasticity equals one, the relative capital share remains constant
while output goes to zero as k ! 0 with L constant. In either event, the absolute
share of capital sinks to zero This implies that the area below the demand curve
would go to zero, while that below the supply curve goes to a positive limit, a,
asr !1 . Thus, the demand curve must lie below the supply curve as r !1
(or as k ! 0) whatever the elasticity of substitution. Now suppose there is
no capital saturation, so that the demand curve never intercepts the horizontal
axis. In this case, clearly the demand curve lies above the supply curve for large
enough values of k, as the supply curve intersects the horizontal axis at k =a.
Since the demand curve lies below the supply curve for small k, and above it
for large k, then given the continuity of both curves, there must be at least one
intersection. Q.E.D.
6For proof see Guha (1963).
7Op.cit.
Corollary: If there is no capital saturation, there is an odd number of
intersections : capital saturation is necessary for an even number of intersections.
Proposition 2: A su¢ cient condition for a unique equilibrium is that
mod[f"(k)] < ak2 :
Proof : f"(k) is the slope of the demand curve (6) and  ak2 the slope of the
supply curve (5). The given condition simply implies that the supply curve is
steeper than the demand curve for any k, so that no more than one intersection
is possible. Along with Proposition 1, this guarantees a unique equilibrium.
However, not every intersection between the supply and demand curves con-
stitutes an equilibrium in which the economy is sure to survive unfavorable
production shocks. To insure the economy against vanishing due to lack of
saving, capital stock in equilibrium must be such that
(8) e < f(k) a( 2+f
0
(k)
1+f 0 (k)
) = f(k)  k(2 + f 0(k) (using (7))
Thus equilibria where the capital stock is not large enough to satisfy (8) are
not safe: there is some danger of the economy disappearing.
An Example
Consider the standard Cobb-Douglas production function f(k) = k. Using
(7), in equilibrium,
(9) k + k =a
While the right hand side of (9) is invariant with k, the left hand side is
monotonically increasing, its derivative being
1 + 2k (1 )> 1 > 0.
Therefore, only one k satises (9). Moreover, there is no capital saturation-
f
0
(k) = k (1 ) ! 0 only as k ! 1 . Therefore, by Proposition 1, an
equilibrium exists and is in this case unique (Figure 1).8 Consider parameter
values = 1/3, a = 7/24, e= 1/13. Then the equilibrium k satisfying (9) is
k = 1/8. Moreover, (8) is satised, as its left hand side is 1/13 while its right
hand side is 1/12 > 1/13. Thus in this equilibrium, there is no danger of not
being able to save enough to meet the target.
One could also provide examples of multiple equilibria, but since rational
expectations would then lead to indeterminacy except in the presence of some
exogenous coordination mechanism, we now turn to a di¤erent model of expec-
tation formation.
4.2. Static Expectations
Under static expectations, every one expects the current periods interest
rate to persist into the next period. In period t, the young observe the marginal
product of capital in production rt = f
0
(kt) , expect this interest rate to continue
and save accordingly, so that st = kt+1 =
a
1+rt
. In the beginning of period t+1,
they loan out their savings for production to the then young generation, charging
an interest rate of precisely rt, thus ensuring their target consumption of a .
However, the marginal product of capital that emerges after absorption of the
wealth inherited from the previous period is f
0
(kt+1): it will be di¤erent from
8All our gures are plotted using Mathematica. Interested readers can refer to our math-
ematica code at http://www.economics.smu.edu.sg/faculty/economics/bguha.asp
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rt unless kt = kt+1, and the currently young who base their saving decisions on
it will save di¤erently from the previous generation. Dynamic equilibrium will
then obtain when
rt+1 = f
0
( a1+rt ) = g(rt) = rt
This is subject to the initial condition
r0 = f
0
(k0)
Here g( ) : R+ ! R+ is a function mapping rt into rt+1. The dynamic
equilibrium is a xed point of g( ). The dynamic adjustment path comprises of
a series frtg1t=0 , given the initial capital stock and technology. The sequence
of interest rates also determines the sequence of future capital stocks via the
relationship kt+1 =
a
1+rt
.
In Figure 29 we plot the function g( ) on the vertical axis against rt on
the horizontal axis. Intersections of the g( ) function with the 45 degree line
represent dynamic equilibria. Now g(0) = f
0
(a)>0 is the vertical intercept of
the g function, so it starts above the 45 degree line provided there is no capital
saturation (the upper curve in Fig. 2). If there is capital saturation at , on the
other hand, so that , then the g function lies along the horizontal axis until we
reach rt = rs =
a
ks   1 where ks is the level of capital at which saturation sets
in (this is where the lower curve in Fig. 2 cuts the x axis). We also note that
the slope of the g function is
g
0
(rt) =   a(1+rt)2 f"(
a
1+rt
) > 0 for f" < 0
So the g function is upward sloping, and unless the production function
exhibits capital saturation at k =a, starts above the 45 degree line.
If there is capital saturation at k =a, there is trivially at least one intersection
between the g function and the 45 degree line (at r = 0). Now restricting our
attention to cases with no capital saturation at k =a, a necessary condition for
at least one crossing is that for some rt, we have f
0
( a1+rt ) < rt.
Now provided the existence condition holds, and again restricting our at-
tention to cases without capital saturation at k =a, a su¢ cient condition for
uniqueness is g"(rt) < 0 . If the g function is concave to the origin throughout
its domain, once it crosses the 45 degree line (from above), it will not cross back
again. This condition can be rewritten as
2a
(1+rt)3
f"( a1+rt ) +
a2
(1+rt)4
f
000
( a1+rt ) < 0 for all rt
As f" < 0, we may immediately infer that if we have f
000  0, we will have
g"(rt) < 0(although this is not necessary to have g"(rt) < 0). In this case, we
will have a unique equilibrium, provided there is no capital saturation at k =a.
Examples
1. As in the rational expectations case, consider the Cobb Douglas pro-
duction function with f(k)=k . Here f
0
(a) = (a) 1 > 0, so that the g
function has a positive vertical intercept. Further, g
0
(rt) =   a(1+rt)2 f"(
a
1+rt
) =
a
(1+rt)2
(1 )( a1+rt ) 2 =
(1 )
(1+rt)a1 
and hence g"(rt) =   
2(1 )
(1+rt)1+a1 
< 0.
Therefore, the criterion for a unique equilibrium is met. We can now check that
9The curves in Figure 2 are plotted for the specic example of a piecewise production
function under varying assumptions (our example 2).
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Notes : The lower curve is plotted for parameter values a=4, a=2.5/b, the upper one for a=4, a =1/b 
the function g has a unique xed point in the positive domain. At this xed
point we have g(r) = r = [ 1+ra ]
1 . Consider =1/2, a=1/4. Then the xed
point solves r = (1 + r)1=2or squaring, r2   r   1 = 0. This quadratic has one
positive and one negative root. We can rule out the negative root, the positive
root is r = 1+
p
5
2 which is the unique intersection of the g function with the 45
degree line (Figure 3).
2. Consider the piecewise quadratic production function with capital satu-
ration
f(k) = ak   bk2 for k < a=2b
f(k) = a
2
4b for k  a=2b.
We have f
0
(k) = a   2bk; k < a2band f
0
(k) = 0; k  a2b . Let us assume rst
that f
0
(a) > 0, or equivalently that a< a2b , so that there is no capital saturation
at k =a and the g function starts above the 45 degree line (the upper curve in
Figure 2). We may check that f"(k) =  2b; f 000 = 0. Therefore, we will always
have g"(rt) < 0. This indicates that there will be a unique intersection of the g
function with the 45 degree line provided a< a2b .We now check this below. The
xed point solves g(r) = a   2b( a1+r ) = r , or r2   (a   1)r   (a   2ba) = 0
. We assume that a > 1. Now given our assumption that a< a2b , we can see
that though the sum of the roots is positive, their product is negative and
hence we have only one root in the positive domain, which is given by r =
a 1+
p
(a 1)2+4(a 2ba)
2 .
However, suppose that there is capital saturation at k =a. This implies that
a> a2b . In this case, the g function corresponds to the x-axis until we reach
rt =
2ba
a   1: at this point the g function becomes upward sloping. We still
have g" < 0. However, because the g function now starts below the 45 degree
line, this no longer implies that there must be a unique intersection. In fact,
we can check that the xed points of g will solve the same quadratic as in the
no-saturation case, but the di¤erence will be that as a> a2b , the product of
the two roots is positive so that both roots are admissible xed points of the g
function. We then have r1;r2 =
a 1
p
(a 1)2 4(2ba a)
2 . We denote the smaller
of these two roots by r1 . In this case, r1is an unstable root (the g function cuts
the 45 degree line from below here), and is bounded by two stable roots, r = 0
and r = r2. Thus if the initial capital stock is such that f
0
(k0) < r1(a relatively
high capital stock) the economy will converge to the stable equilibrium with
r = 0; k =a> a2b . If the initial capital stock is lower, so that f
0
(k0) > r1, we
converge to the other stable equilibrium with r= r2; k = f
0 1(r2) =
a
1+r2
. This
equilibrium has a higher interest rate and lower savings.
Capital saturation is not however necessary for multiple equilibria, as the
following examples will show.
3.Consider the negative rectangular hyperbola
f(k) = A  Bk for k  B=A
f(k) = 0 for k < B=A.
Now f
0
(a) = Ba2 > 0 so again there is a positive vertical intercept. The xed
Figure 3 
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points of the g function must solve the equation Ba2 (1 + r)
2 = r, or r2   (a2B  
2)r+1 = 0. Provided a2 > 2B, the equation has two real positive roots. In this
case, at the smaller root the g function cuts the 45 degree line from above, and
in the second it cuts it from below (Fig. 4).
4.Consider
f(k) = A+ Bk2   Ck ; k > 2BC
f(k) = A  C24B ; k  2BC
This technology reects minimum size requirements and a marginal product
of capital that initially increases and then diminishes. A minimum level of capi-
tal is needed to raise output beyond a certain level only then does the marginal
product of additional capital become positive. We assume that parameters are
such that a> 2BC so that f
0
(a) = g(0) > 0. The xed points of the g function
must solve the equation
C
a2 (1 + r)
2   2Ba3 (1 + r)3 = r,
or
 2Br3 + (aC   6B)r2   (a3   2aC + 6B)r+aC   2B = 0
Using Descartesrule of signs, the above cubic equation will have 3 positive
roots if B > 0;aC   6B > 0;a3   2aC + 6B > 0;aC   2B > 0. We have already
assumed the rst and last of these inequalities. Consider parameter values of
B = 1=2; C = 11
(36)1=3
;a= (36)1=3. We can check that these values satisfy all
of the above conditions and that they yield 3 positive real roots, r = 1; r = 2
and r = 5. We can also check that the equilibrium capital stocks corresponding
to these three interest rates are, respectively, k = (36)
1=3
2 ,k =
(36)1=3
3 and k =
(36)1=3
6 , all of which are greater than k =
2B
C = k =
(36)1=3
11 , which is the minimum
capital stock at which the marginal product of capital becomes positive. Of the
interest rates, the middle one r = 2 represents an unstable root while the
other two at r = 1 and r = 5 are stable (Fig.5).
Thus, multiple equilibria can obtain even without capital saturation we
may have either an odd or an even number of intersections. Generalizing, we
can say that in such cases, an odd number of intersections involves unstable
equilibria bounded by stable equilibria the intersections where the g function
cuts the 45 degree line from above are stable, while those where it cuts the 45
degree line from below are unstable. This implies the existence of trapsini-
tial historical capital stock fully determines which dynamic stable equilibrium
the economy converges to. If the number of equilibria is odd, then starting from
any initial capital stock, the economy always converges to some stable equilib-
rium. However, if the number of intersections is even, then if the initial capital
stock is too small such that f
0
(k0) > r , where r is the interest rate associated
with the even-numbered xed point with the largest interest rate, then we have
an explosive situation of ever-growing interest rates and ever contracting capital
stock. We will show below that in this situation it becomes increasingly likely
that a bad shock wipes out the economy.
So far we have ignored the possibility that a bad shock may wipe out the
economy by making it impossible for young people to have non-negative rst
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Note : This curve is plotted for parameter values of a=√5B. 
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period consumption after paying their interest obligations and saving to meet
their target. However, suppose we have
et < f(
a
1+rt 1
)  a
1+f 0 ( a1+rt 1 )
 a for all t,
Since shocks are bounded, this implies that the economy will not disappear
even with the most unfavorable shocks. Here, the rst term on the right hand
side represents output in period t, the second term represents the saving that
needs to be done to meet next periods target, and the third term represents
the repayments (inclusive of both principal and interest) to be made to the
older generation. We can check that the right hand side is decreasing in r: the
derivative is
.   a(1+rt 1)2 f
0
( a1+rt 1 ) +
a
(1+f 0 ( a1+rt 1 ))
2 f
"( a1+rt 1 ) < 0
So the inequality is more di¢ cult to satisfy for large r. Suppose there are an
odd number of xed points - let r
0
be the interest rate at the stable equilibrium
with the largest interest rate of all the xed points. Then, if the inequality is
satised at r = r
0
, it will be satised at all smaller interest rates. Then, all the
dynamic equilibria will be robust to bad shocks. However, if the initial capital
stock is very small such that f
0
(k0) > r
0
, then although there will be a tendency
to converge towards the equilibrium with r = r
0
, we cannot guarantee that a
su¢ ciently bad shock will not wipe out the economy during its transition path
to this equilibrium. If there are an even number of xed points, then even if
the inequality is satised at the xed point with the largest interest rate, this
is an unstable xed point : if the initial capital stock was such that the initial
interest rate was larger than this, we would have an explosive situation during
which capital stock would progressively contract and r would become larger.
Therefore the likelihood increases of a bad shock wiping out the economy in
this case.
Thus static expectations introduce dynamics into our model. Where there
is a unique equilibrium, rational and static expectations are similar in yield-
ing a denite prediction. However, there is a di¤erence when the production
technology is such as to admit multiple equilibria. In the rational expectations
model, the lack of dynamics and of an explicit co-ordination device results in
indeterminacy. In the static expectations model, however, history determines
which (stable) equilibrium the economy converges to in the long run. For some
production functions (those yielding an even number of xed points), a su¢ -
ciently small initial capital stock can result in long run instability with ever
contracting capital stock and ever increasing interest rates. Of course, during
this process it is likely that a bad shock may cause the economy to disappear.
The existence of trapsin the case of multiple equilibria with static expec-
tations means that the role of intervention becomes signicant. An economy
where people exhibit target saving behavior may converge to a dynamic steady
state with high interest rate and low capital stock and therefore low output 
if the initial capital stock is low enough. However if the initial capital stock is
a bit higher (enough to push the initial interest rate below that associated with
the next unstable root), the economy will converge to a dynamic steady state
with low interest rates and high capital stock (high savings and output). The
latter clearly Pareto dominates the former steady state because of higher over-
all output. This dependence of the ultimate fate of the economy on the initial
capital stock implies that a one-time intervention say, in the form of foreign
aid that increases the initial capital stock would have permanent e¤ects on the
long run fate of the economy. The possibility of a permanent Pareto improve-
ment through a one-time intervention, such as acquiring foreign aid, increases
the attractiveness of such measures from the perspective both of the countrys
government and of the donor.
.
5. Further di¤erences with models with traditional utility func-
tions
In a previous section we have indicated how target saving behavior can
be thought of as a special case of the more standard CRRA utility functions
with specic and di¤erent values of the risk aversion parameters. Now we
focus on other ways in which the target saving model di¤ers in its results from
models with traditional utility and saving functions.10 We focus on two major
distinctions.
First, conventional saving models are derived from utility functions like the
symmetric CRRA form:
u =
c1 1
1  +
c1 2
(1+)(1 ) :
This yields the savings ratio
s(r) = (1+r)
(1 )=
(1+)1=+(1+r)(1 )=
The equation of motion becomes
kt+1 = s[f
0
(kt+1)][f(kt)  ktf 0(kt)].
With a Cobb-Douglas production function, the steady state value of k is
thus the solution of the equation
k[(1+ )1= +(1+k 1)(1 )=] = (1 )k(1+k 1)(1 )=
Evidently, the roots of the equation are functions of  and , the rate of
time preference and the coe¢ cient of risk aversion. In contrast, though our
saving model can be related to a specic parametrization of the asymmetric
CRRA model,all our results have been established without using this specic
form. They are independent of both the parameters  and , and depend only
on the characteristics of the production function and on the value of the target
a.
The results of the two models di¤er, not just in their quantitative dimensions,
but qualitatively as well, in the number and characteristics of their equilibria. To
illustrate, with our piece-wise quadratic production function, if a> a2b the target
saving model yields an unstable equilibrium bounded by two stable equilibria.
With the popular log-linear utility function u = log c1 + log c2=(1 + ); the
same production function yields a unique root k = (a  2  )=b.
The second major di¤erence with traditional models lies in the fact that with
rational expectations/perfect foresight, target saving only admits of stationary
10For examples of these see Azariadis (1993), Romer (1995). The latter summarizes the
Diamond (1965) model. There has been a vast subsequent literature on OLG models of which
a few instances are cited in our literature review section.
states, as pointed out in equation (4). Any deviation from stationary values
(say through a gift of capital from abroad) is instantly eliminated. This also
implies that if there are multiple stationary equilibria, indeterminacy and indeed
breakdown will occur in the absence of a coordination mechanism. With more
traditional utility functions, perfect foresight is compatible with a variety of
time-paths and with multiple equilibria between which choice is determined by
history. If we replace the assumption of perfect foresight by an adaptive model
of expectation formation (illustrated here by static expectations), target saving
too yields the full range of dynamic processes and equilibria for di¤erent kinds
of production functions as with conventional utility functions.
6. Conclusion
We have analyzed an overlapping generations model of target savers .
Target savingis a form of behavior of which there has been surprisingly little
prior theoretical modeling. We have attempted to provide an intuitive justi-
cation for this saving motive showing that within the framework of traditional
CRRA utility functions target saving can be regarded as a special case where
the coe¢ cients of risk aversion take on specic and di¤erent values in the two
periods of life in an OLG model. We have also compared our model more gener-
ally with more standard models and given examples of how its predictions di¤er
from those of standard models for the same set of production functions. In our
model, the older generation can insure themselves against all production shocks
by setting a pre-negotiated interest rate on their loans to the productive younger
generation. We have identied some conditions governing the existence of equi-
librium, and the number of equilibria. We have given examples of a unique
equilibrium and have also shown that multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria are
possible. In the latter case we may have high-interest low-saving equilibria as
well as low-interest high-saving equilibria. With rational expectations, indeter-
minacy arises when the technology admits multiple equilibria, due to the lack
of dynamics. But when expectations are static, history enables us to pin down
the long run fate of the economy, regardless of the technology. When the tech-
nology admits of multiple equilibria, there is the possibility that an economy
may become trapped in a sub-optimal equilibrium due to unfavorable initial
conditions, highlighting the long-run e¤ects of a one-time intervention.
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